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“We’re a family. You owe us,” said thirty-eight year old African American mother Jo 
Ann Talley, facing a panel of nine school board members intent upon closing down her alma 
mater Riverside High School, located in downtown Chattanooga, Tennessee.1 As she challenged 
the board with this statement at a public forum on June 21, 1983, nearly one hundred other 
African American community members stood behind her, also armed with impassioned pleas for 
the survival of the school which had served themselves, their children, or both for over two 
decades. “Why do you always have to take the black people from their foundation?” cried 
Charlotte Harris, another Riverside alumni. Francine Ricks, a student at the predominantly black 
high school then, explained, “I’m a poor child. Rich students can afford to go to private 
schools…I would like to graduate at Riverside High. All we’re asking for is a chance.” “This is a 
black and white issue,” added 1967 graduate Peggy Mack, eliciting a murmur of agreement from 
the crowd. Holding a poster drawing of an open grave, W.C. Tate summarized the prevailing 
sentiment in the room with the simple statement, “You’ve buried us.”2 After fervently making 
their case before the all-white board, protestors broke into the Riverside fight song in a final, 
emotional effort to sway these men away from closing their beloved school. One week later, on 
June 29, the board voted 7-2 in favor of shutting down Riverside High, issuing a public statement 
that they did not want to “prolong the agony” of the Riverside family. As consolation for the 
                                                     
1 Mark Kennedy, “Riverside Backers Make Fervent Pleas for School’s Future,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press, 
June 22, 1983, Newspaper clipping in University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. 
Witt Chattanooga Public School Desegregation Records, Box 14, Folder 12.  
2 J.B. Collins, “City School Board Hears Pleas For Riverside,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press, June 23, 1983, 
Newspaper clipping in University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga 
Public Schools Desegregation Records, Box 14, Folder 12. 
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African American community’s loss, the school board suggested opening, “a depository to 
display school athletic trophies.”3 
 The origins of the issues which plagued Riverside High School and eventually led to its 
1983 closing can be traced back to the school’s founding exactly twenty years earlier. Prior to 
the mid-1960s, the high school building located on East 3rd Street, near the downtown district of 
Chattanooga, was known as Chattanooga High or City High and housed a predominantly white 
student body. In 1963, amidst the numerous changes wrought by the Chattanooga school board’s 
plan for desegregation, Chattanooga High was relocated across the Tennessee River stationed 
among the burgeoning northern suburbs, and renamed City High.4 In turn, the East 3rd building 
was renamed Riverside High School and served an all-black student population from the first day 
its doors opened in September 1963.  
Image 1.1 
 
                                                     
3 Mark Kennedy, “School Board Votes to Close Riverside,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press, June 30, 1983, 
Newspaper clipping in University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga 
Public Schools Desegregation Records, Box 14, Folder 12.  
4 See Image 1.1 for a map of Chattanooga’s high school zones and a visual depiction of the respective “City” and 
“Riverside” zones.  
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The troubling racial dynamics of this reconfiguration—the opening of a brand new facility in the 
white, middle-class suburbs and the designation of a hand-me-down building as an all-black 
school—would later prompt NAACP attorney Avon Williams to state in federal court, “So what 
[the school board] did was to change this Chattanooga High School to the black high school and 
move the white children into the new white high school out in the suburbs, didn’t [they]?”5 
While Williams’s statement had merit, it underestimated the amount of loyalty and devotion the 
Riverside student body held for their school. As student Otis McGhee claimed when protesting 
the school’s closure in 1983, the first few graduating classes “took a run-down school and made 
something of it.”6 However, twenty years after the school’s opening, statements such as these 
could not disguise the fact that Riverside stood in bad condition. In the 1962-1963 school year, 
enrollment was down by 52 percent from ten years prior, 17 percent of the senior class failed to 
receive a diploma, and only 24 courses were offered to students, compared to the 55-70 offered 
at other Chattanooga high schools.7 Rather than provide funding or take measures to stabilize 
Riverside, the school board firmly pursued their goal of total closure, inciting an emotional and 
ultimately fruitless community protest effort. Upon the school’s disintegration in the fall of 1983, 
the Chattanooga board of education rezoned the majority of Riverside’s students to Howard 
High, another all-black school. Superintendent James McCullough assured the local newspaper, 
“It’s legal.”8 
                                                     
5 “Official Transcript of Proceedings in Civil Action No. 3564, May 10, 1971,” University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, Box 6, 
Folder 2. 
6 Kennedy, “Riverside Backers…” 
7 Kennedy, “School Board Votes…” 
8 Mark Kennedy, “Riverside Shutdown Seems Sure,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press, June 19, 1983, 
Newspaper clipping in University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt 
Desegregation Records, Box 14, Folder 12.  
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 In many ways, the Riverside story was defined by dubitable actions on behalf of the 
school board—the “handing down” of an older facility to an all-black student population, the 
systematic neglect of the school for over ten years, the refusal to bus in other students to save the 
school or consider closing another predominantly white school with low enrollment, etc. 
However, Riverside’s problems with low enrollment and neglected facilities were not unique to 
Chattanooga public schools throughout the 1980s. In 1989, the enrollment at Howard High 
School, another all-black Chattanooga secondary school, was down 51 percent from ten years 
prior.9 Patterns of drastically decreased enrollment evidenced themselves within all majority 
black schools—elementary, middle, and high. For the school system as a whole, student 
enrollment stood at 11,704 by the 1989 school year, nearly one third of the 27,480 which had 
enrolled in 1966.10 Drastic demographic changes accompanied these startling figures. Between 
1966 and 1989, the student body of the Chattanooga school system dropped from 46.5 percent 
black and 53.5 percent white to 78 percent black and 22 percent white.11 More than two decades 
after the onset of desegregation in Chattanooga, the disparity in racial balance within schools had 
only increased.  
 In order to fully understand Chattanooga’s school system as it stood in the late 1980s, one 
must trace the complex history of the desegregation process back to its legal enactment—the 
landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court case—and follow its 
implementation in Chattanooga schools through twenty-six years of litigation. During the year 
following the Brown v. Board mandate, Chattanooga’s school board issued an official statement 
                                                     
9 The two other majority black high schools in Chattanooga, Kirkman Technical School and Tyner High School, 
were also down 44 percent and 34 percent, respectively.  
10 Barbara O’Reilly, “City Enrollment Down Drastically in Past Decade,” The Chattanooga Times-Free Press, 
January 5, 1989, Newspaper clipping in University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. 
Witt Desegregation Records, Box 14, Folder 12.  
11 O’Reilly, “City Enrollment…” 
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of compliance to the community, one that ultimately veiled a lack of concrete action. In 1960, 
local African American citizen and NAACP member James Mapp sued the Chattanooga Board 
of Education for their failure to actualize the Supreme Court order in a case that lasted over two 
decades due to exhaustive appeals from both sides. The actual implementation of desegregation 
in schools began in 1962, when sixteen elementary schools were integrated as part of a gradual 
desegregation plan approved by federal judge Frank Wilson, who presided over the Mapp v. 
Board case. This measured, grade-by-grade approach was disrupted in 1967, when Wilson 
ordered that federal funding for Chattanooga’s public schools should be contingent upon their 
full and immediate desegregation. Two years later, Mapp filed a motion for further relief, 
bringing the issue of integration back into the courtroom. This time, the Chattanooga school 
board was forced to submit an entirely new plan for desegregation, one of which included the 
controversial practice of busing students to achieve a racial balance. Over the next fifteen years, 
Mapp and the school board met in court intermittently, with Mapp’s representation continuously 
insisting that the school board failed to produce integrated schools and the school board 
maintaining that de facto segregation lay outside their control. In 1986, the case was officially 
dismissed from the judicial system when the Supreme Court declined to hear it, thus upholding 
the rulings of lower courts. For the first time in twenty-six years, James Mapp and his attorney 
Avon Williams had no recourse to take, and Chattanooga schools fell from wary federal eyes.  
 The complex history of desegregation in Chattanooga can best be examined in two major 
time periods, the first of which spans from the 1955 Brown v. Board decision to 1971, when the 
Chattanooga school board was forced to accept a desegregation plan that included busing. This 
section will focus predominantly on the school board’s lack of action between 1955 and 1960, 
the subsequent demand for action from the black community in the form of the Mapp legal case, 
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and the slow nature of change during the first decade of implemented desegregation. This lack of 
change ultimately culminated in some of the most visible protest movements of the Chattanooga 
desegregation era, as the black and white students of Brainerd High School clashed at two points 
during the 1969-1970 school year. The second portion of this paper will cover the time between 
the 1971 busing decision and the final dismissal of the Mapp case in 1986. During this era, the 
fight for and against desegregation evolved, as the white middle class of Chattanooga showed 
their distaste for integration by turning to legal resistance and “white flight” to county schools 
and private institutions as opposed to the more visible protest or resistance in previous decades. 
The potency and power of residential segregation also became a crucial factor during this time, 
as the Chattanooga school board continued to argue in court that segregated residential patterns 
lay outside their control. Ultimately, this argument was effective in court, as the case was 
dismissed in 1986 on grounds that the school board had done all within their power to eliminate 
segregation in schools. Although the story of desegregation in Chattanooga never featured the 
massive white resistance and protest that marked and dramatized desegregation efforts in many 
other American cities throughout the 1960s and 1970s, I argue that the confluence of entrenched 
residential segregation, ample opportunity for “white flight” to private schools, and white, 
middle-class legal resistance enabled the school board to maintain de facto segregation in 
schools throughout the nationwide desegregation crisis.  
Struggle in the Hallways: 1955-1971 
 The initial wave of public school integration that swept the nation throughout the late 
1950s and 1960s were largely characterized by a tentative and gradual approach to racial equality 
in schools, expressed through “freedom of choice” plans and thwarted by growing residential 
segregation. In 1954, when the original Brown v. Board Supreme Court ruling was made, the 
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majority of white Americans were far more concerned with the struggle for democracy being 
acted out on the international stage than they were with ensuring all children received an equal 
education at home. Additionally, the original 1954 desegregation ruling provided no mechanism 
for its own implementation. The Supreme Court addressed this issue the following year by 
inserting the “with all deliberate speed” clause, which allowed individual school boards the 
freedom to enact desegregation policies at the rate and scope they saw fit. Such a phrase—“with 
all deliberate speed”—proved to be frustratingly vague, as it provided no concrete parameters on 
the timing or method of implementation and ultimately allowed pro-segregationists time to 
organize.12 As a result of this, most cities, including Chattanooga, delayed action for as long as 
possible, often until a legal case propelled them into court. The court orders that arose from this 
first round of litigation were typically “freedom of choice” plans, wherein the school board 
would disavow a dual system of black and white schools and thus “open up” schools to children 
of both races, allowing them to select where they attended. Chattanooga adopted such a plan in 
1962; however, like in most other cities, this practice produced little integration, as few black 
students elected to transfer to white schools and nearly zero white students chose to attend black 
schools.  
 Historians have examined the “freedom of choice” plans which emerged during the first 
phase of desegregation, roughly 1955-1965. Scholar Jeffrey Raffel explains, “Freedom-of-choice 
plans provided minority students with the formal right to select a school other than their formerly 
assigned ‘black’ school.”13 These plans were founded upon the idea that segregated schools 
existed when a minority student’s race prevented him or her from attending a certain school. 
                                                     
12 Brian Daugherity and Charles C. Bolton, With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008): 11. 
13 Jeffrey A. Raffel, Historical Dictionary of School Segregation and Desegregation: The American Experience, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998): 109.  
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Subsequent logic indicated that allowing a minority student to “choose” to attend a majority 
white school would remedy this problem and ensure compliance with Brown v. Board. However, 
as historian Charles Bolton argues in his study of desegregation in Mississippi, “Given the 
history of segregated education, a desegregation mechanism such as freedom of choice…had 
little chance of being implemented fairly. Freedom of choice school desegregation saddled 
blacks with the burden of having to choose affirmatively to topple a segregated educational 
structure dearly supported by whites.”14 “Affirmative” is a key word here, as its meaning within 
the context of desegregation would later shift. Whereas freedom of choice plans placed an 
affirmative responsibility upon black students to overcome the racism awaiting them at all-white 
schools, later desegregation plans would confer an affirmative responsibility to school boards 
and school officials—the responsibility to ensure that black students were truly assimilated into 
the schools available to them.  
 Freedom of choice plans were also problematic in that they highlighted the stark 
segregated residential patterns which strengthened throughout the 1950s and 1960s due to 
discriminatory practices in the housing market and the growing displacement of African 
Americans brought about by urban revitalization projects. The single system of school zones that 
was applied to all portions of the city—zones that could be easily circumvented through freedom 
of choice—coincided with neighborhood demographics in a way that precluded actual 
integration. White children still attended the white schools in their zones, and black children still 
attended the black schools in their respective zones. This phenomenon held true almost without 
exception in Chattanooga during the early years of desegregation, as a review of the city’s spatial 
and residential history will demonstrate. The segregation that this perpetuated in Chattanooga 
                                                     
14 Charles C. Bolton, The Hardest Deal of All: The Battle Over School Integration in Mississippi, 1870-1890, 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2005): 142-143.  
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produced a great deal of outrage. Unlike many other cities, whose most volatile protest 
movements arose during the 1970s with busing mandates, Chattanooga citizens displayed the 
majority of visible discontent during the first phase of desegregation.  
The Era of Inaction: Between Brown and Mapp 
 Opposition to integration arose early in Chattanooga, with many public officials initially 
protesting the Supreme Court order to desegregate public schools, a mandate finalized by the 
conclusion of the Brown v. Board case on May 17, 1954. In the days following the verdict, the 
front page of Chattanooga’s daily newspaper, The Chattanooga Times, was repeatedly 
emblazoned with Associated Press headlines and articles declaring the unprecedented, anti-
segregationist decision, while the editorial section within revealed local responses. In one 1954 
article, entitled “Negro Opportunities Won’t Change in City,” reporter J.B. Collins discussed the 
reactions to the rulings expressed by white male community leaders. Frank Trotter, then the 
Commissioner of Education for Chattanooga, stated that he “[did] not believe that the 
elimination of segregation in city schools [would] increase the educational opportunities of the 
Negro pupils here.”15 Other prominent figures, such as chairman of the county school board, 
echoed Trotter’s sentiment, arguing that there was no need for a change in the situation in 
Chattanooga until “the Supreme Court [handed] down its specific decree on what southern 
school systems [could] and [couldn’t] do.”16 Articles such as these also asserted that white and 
black schools in Chattanooga already had equal facilities, equal pay for teachers, and equal 
monetary allotment for students, demonstrating the blindness and indifference of public officials 
to the very need for a decision such as Brown v. Board. Public representatives such as Trotter 
                                                     
15 J.B. Collins, “Negro Opportunities Won’t Change in City,” The Chattanooga Times, May 18, 1954.  
16 Collins, “Negro Opportunities…” 
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and Wallace, men who would later be instrumental in forming desegregation policy, felt from the 
outset that segregation was an acceptable or even preferred state for Chattanooga’s schools.  
 Despite this evidence of early resistance to the desegregation mandate, the Chattanooga 
school board made a showing of support for the integration of schools in the year following 
Brown v. Board by announcing an intention to comply with the federal verdict. However, in 
actuality, these efforts disguised a lack of real action, as no concrete developments happened in 
the schools themselves until nearly a decade afterwards. In August 1955, the school board 
released an official statement that opened with, “The Chattanooga Board of Education will 
comply with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on the matter of integration in the 
public schools.”17 This document suggested that the school board would “counsel with the 
people of our community, seeking their advice and opinions in an atmosphere of earnest and 
calm deliberation, hoping that as each decision is made, and as each step is taken, the community 
will accept our decisions.”18 Despite the pervasiveness of conciliatory language, the document 
also made it clear that no progress would be made hastily: “The Supreme Court decision does not 
require immediate and complete integration. Your School Board does not contemplate any 
immediate change in the operation of our schools.”19 Here, the school board relied heavily upon 
the “with all deliberate speed” clause of the 1955 Brown v. Board decision. By emphasizing that 
the Supreme Court had “wisely” entrusted them with the responsibility of “examin[ing] 
individual local situation before making any final decisions,” they carefully reserved for 
themselves the authority to implement desegregation according to their preferences, rather than 
                                                     
17 “Official Statements of the Chattanooga Board of Education on the Supreme Court Decisions of May 17, 1954 
and May 31, 1955,” from University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt 
Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, 
http://digitalcollections.library.utc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p16877coll8/id/1964 (Accessed March 5, 2016).  
18 “Official Statements…” 
19 “Official Statements…” 
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those of the community or even the federal government.20 This authoritative language would 
fade from the school board’s arsenal of propaganda over the course of the 1960s, as the federal 
judiciary increasingly asserted their right to determine the course of desegregation.  
 One of the most revealing examples of the gap between school board promises and 
concrete change throughout the 1950s can be seen in the dismantling of an “Interracial Advisory 
Committee”—a body composed of black and white community members intended to shape 
Chattanooga’s desegregation policy in the aftermath of Brown v. Board.21 While the idea of both 
races united to determine the direction of integration sounded like a noble concept, the 
demographic composition of the committee and its almost immediate dissolution in the face of 
community protest reveal the inefficacy of the group. First, the racial makeup of this body was 
highly skewed, with twenty-seven of the thirty-nine members being white.22 Although African 
Americans were represented in the committee, the interests of the white community dominated 
the committee’s agenda. Furthermore, a 1955 letter from Sue W. Albright, one of the original 
members of the IAC, to the Chattanooga superintendent reveals that angry white pro-
segregationists protested meetings of this committee, hindering any progress the group might 
have made. In this letter, Albright advised that Mr. Witt, “in announcing future meetings will 
emphatically state that police will clear the room of all but the press in the event of disorderly 
demonstration.”23 Albright’s account, coupled with the sudden disappearance of any of trace of 
the Interracial Advisory Committee after 1955, suggests that this initial effort made by the 
                                                     
20 “Official Statements…” 
21 “Chattanooga Board of Education Interracial Advisory Committee Roster, November 9, 1955,” from University of 
Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation 
Records, http://digital-collections.library.utc.edu/cdm/ref/ collection/p16877coll8/id/1903 (Accessed March 25, 
2016).  
22 “Chattanooga Board of Education Interracial Advisory…” 
23 “Sue W. Albright Correspondence with Raymond Witt, November 17, 1955,” From University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, 
http://cdm16877.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16877coll8/id/ 2013 (Accessed February 28, 2016).  
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Chattanooga school board to enforce desegregation quickly disintegrated and affected no actual 
change. 
 Aside from physical protests such as those conducted by white anti-integrationists at the 
meetings of the Interracial Advisory Committee, black and white citizens of Chattanooga and 
other regions of Tennessee expressed frustration with their school board through petitions and 
letters throughout the latter half of the 1950s. Although written by groups with competing 
agendas, these letters similarly challenged the board’s claim that the community was progressing 
towards successful desegregation. In 1958, an African American organization called the Citizens 
for General Improvement (CGI) submitted a newsletter to the Chattanooga Board of Education 
in hopes of “improving the economic, social, and political conditions of all citizens in this 
community.”24 The CGI’s principle purpose in publishing this newsletter was to bring attention 
to the unfavorable conditions and overcrowding in three predominantly black schools—Calvin 
Donaldson, Orchard Knob, and Chattanooga Avenue. By directly accusing the local school board 
of not taking “one step in that direction [towards integration],” they refuted many white 
Chattanooga citizens’ argument that African Americans did not actually desire integration.25 
Another 1958 letter, this one authored by an organization of white southerners called the 
Tennessee Society to Maintain Segregation, expressed a similar frustration with the Chattanooga 
school board, albeit for the opposite reason—the board’s statement of compliance with the 
Supreme Court mandate.26 This group, self-described as “a civic organization representing at this 
                                                     
24 “Citizens for General Improvement Newsletter, October 11, 1958,” From University of Tennessee at Chattanooga 
Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, 
http://cdm16877.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16877coll8/id/ 2045 (Accessed February 28, 2016).  
25 “Citizens for General Improvement…” 
26 In the aftermath of the Brown v. Board decision, numerous organizations and councils of white southerners 
dedicated to the overhaul of integration policies formed in both the Deep South and border states such as Tennessee. 
In April of 1956, an interstate organization called the Citizens’ Council of America was created to unite these 
various factions of organized racists. Although each individual body, including the Tennessee Society to Maintain 
Segregation, employed disparate methods of resistance, all saw the denial of socio-political equality to black men 
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time over 25,000 citizens who are taxpayers and are vitally interested in their public schools,” 
framed their petition as a questionnaire for the school board, with questions ranging from simple 
personal inquiries to pointedly racist questions such as, “Do you take pride in being a member of 
the white race?”27 Because Tennessee and other states on the fringes of the Deep South fostered 
a climate of comparative racial moderation, extremist groups such as this did not garner the same 
enthusiasm there as elsewhere. Organized racism in the Upper South simply struggled to find 
proponents.28 Therefore, it comes as little surprise that the Tennessee Society to Maintain 
Segregation’s correspondence elicited no apparent reaction from the Chattanooga school board. 
However, its existence within the body of evidence from this era in Chattanooga’s desegregation 
process indicates that the school board’s statement of compliance with Brown v. Board 
motivated local and regional white citizens alike to demand a retraction.  
“Freedom of Choice”: Mapp v. Board and Residential Segregation in Chattanooga 
 The demands for action from Chattanooga’s white and black communities was finally 
met in 1960, when NAACP member James Mapp sued the Chattanooga Board of Education for 
failing to actualize school desegregation in a case that would last over two decades. Mapp, the 
father of four children in the Chattanooga public school system, took issue with the fact that his 
son and three daughters were denied the ability to enroll in the school closest and therefore most 
convenient for them. Using his legal connections with the NAACP, he brought a case against the 
Chattanooga Board of Education with the help of Avon Williams, a Nashville attorney who 
                                                     
and women as their primary function. For more, see Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens’ Council: Organized Resistance 
to the Second Reconstruction 1954-1964, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994) 
27 “Tennessee Society to Maintain Segregation Correspondence with Raymond B. Witt, October 1955,” From 
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Public Schools Desegregation 
Records. http://cdm16877.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ p16877coll8/id/2412 (Accessed February 28, 
2016). See Image 1.2 in appendix.  
28 McMillen, The Citizen’s Council, 95.  
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would come to be known for his relentlessness in the court room and determination to appeal.29 
For the other defendants, local attorney and school board member Raymond Witt volunteered his 
services as legal counsel. Witt would eventually step down from his position on the school board 
to concentrate on his legal work, and both he and Williams remained the primary counsel for the 
defendants and plaintiffs respectively until the 1986 dismissal. The first phase of this case was 
tried in district court under Judge Frank Wilson on July 20, 1960, and on this day, the courts 
ruled that Chattanooga’s existing school system was unconstitutional and that a plan for 
desegregation must be submitted to the district court before December of that year.30 According 
to this “freedom of choice” plan, which cycled through two amendments before approval by the 
courts, the first through third grades of Chattanooga’s elementary schools would be desegregated 
in the 1962-1963 school year by the application of “a single system of zones,” with subsequent 
grades integrated in the following years. Chattanooga parents could elect whether to send their 
child to their neighborhood school or elsewhere, but in order to attend outside the prescribed 
zone, they would have to fill out a transfer application.31  In July of 1961, this method was 
accepted by the district court as adequate progress towards full desegregation.  
 In order to further understand the minimal effect that this first “freedom of choice” 
desegregation plan had on public schools in practice, one must first review the history of 
                                                     
29 NAACP lawyers such as Avon Williams were instrumental in fighting segregation throughout the nation during 
the 1960s and 1970s, as the organization saw litigation and the Supreme Court as the best avenue for securing the 
constitutional rights of African Americans. In Tennessee, Williams also assisted with the concurrent desegregation 
cases fought in Nashville and Memphis. For more on the legal strategies employed by the NAACP in desegregation 
cases, see Gilbert Jonas, Freedom’s Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle against Racism in America, 1909-1969, 
(New York, Routledge, 2005); Mark Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925-
1950, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).  
30 “Mapp v. Board of Education Proceedings, July 20, 1960,” From University of Tennessee Special Collections, 
Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, 
http://cdm16877.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16877coll8/id/988 (Accessed March 28, 2016). 
31 “Resolution for the Submission of a Plan of Desegregation of Chattanooga Public Schools to the District Court, 
1960,” From the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public 
Schools Desegregation Records, http://cdm16877.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16877coll8/id/2154 
(Accessed April 1, 2014). 
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residential patterns in Chattanooga. From the initial phases of the Mapp v. Board case until the 
very end of the case in 1986, racially inequitable zoning policies and housing practices contained 
African Americans within certain neighborhoods and played arguably the most crucial role in 
frustrating desegregation efforts. Although the prevalence of housing segregation did not surface 
as an argument in court until the 1970s, its insidious effects could be seen as early as 1962 and 
should therefore be discussed from the outset. Understanding how neighborhoods were carefully 
structured and maintained by municipal and private organizations of Chattanooga lends 
explanation to the inefficacy of a single system of zones and a “freedom of choice” plan. Simply 
put, white children remained in white schools because they lived in white neighborhoods, and the 
inverse held true for black children in the fulfillment of a narrative that originated over a century 
before.32  
 The development of Chattanooga’s urban landscape began in the mid-nineteenth century, 
as the region developed into an industrial city due to its strategic location on the Tennessee River 
at the gateway between Lookout and Signal Mountains. Incorporated in 1839, it rapidly 
expanded into the leading commercial center of the area, bolstered by accessibility to water 
transportation and ample railways.33 As the epicenter of industrial development, the downtown 
area of Chattanooga attracted many heavy industry workers and their families, and these low-
income employees, many of them black, settled in close proximity to their jobs. As a result of the 
growing industrialization and subsequent pollution of the downtown area, white families who 
could afford to do so began their exodus to the wealthy neighborhoods of Signal and Lookout 
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Mountains, as well as growing suburban areas on the city’s outskirts. The African American 
residents of the industrial center were left to occupy what little dilapidated, low-income housing 
was present. However, during the post-World War II economic boom, white city officials 
decided that in order to reclaim downtown, they would institute a number of federally-subsidized 
urban “revitalization” programs—a common phenomenon throughout the nation in the 1950s. In 
Chattanooga, this movement was known as the Golden Gateway Urban Renewal Project, and it 
prophesied highway construction, improved residential areas, reduced pollution, and, most 
threatening for black residents, the eradication of “blighted” or slum structures. In his book The 
Origins of the Urban Crisis, historian Thomas Sugrue discusses a similar project that took place 
in downtown Detroit during the 1950s and its adverse effects on the black population. As he 
states, “The city’s redevelopment projects soon demonstrated the commonplace wisdom of the 
streets that ‘slum removal equals Negro removal.’ The city had no adequate relocation plans for 
residents uprooted by urban renewal.”34 As result of this disregard, black residents of Detroit had 
two choices. They could choose to grapple for equality within the private housing market, where 
racially restrictive neighborhood covenants and discriminatory practices in real estate frustrated 
them at every turn. More commonly, however, impoverished African American citizens were 
crammed into whatever little public housing remained, worsening decaying conditions there and 
validating the city’s call for further ghetto removal.35 
 Chattanooga’s Golden Gateway project created a similar dilemma for black residents 
living in downtown Chattanooga during the late 1950s and 1960s. As city planners and public 
officials prepared for the construction of Interstate 24 and a fleet of new office buildings along 
                                                     
34 Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 50.  
35 Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 134. 
 Reed 18 
Market and Broad Street, they devised a “rating system” that justified elimination much of the 
public housing black workers relied on to house their families. Carried out by a municipal body 
called the Better Housing Commission, a series of surveys rated each census tract in Chattanooga 
based on condition of structures, homogeneity of land use, community service, streets, and 
housing. The description of point distributions and deductions reveals the survey’s racist 
undertones: “Areas which have seen a marked change from white to Negro occupancy in recent 
years have been designated as transition areas…It should be noted that Negro occupancy, per se, 
is not of course a depreciating factor. However, the process of transition at the present time 
creates problems of friction and disrupts community ties.”36 Despite the claim that black 
residency was punishable, “per se,” communities were awarded points for “not being a 
transitional area” and “having few or no conversions to multi-family dwelling.”37 Sugrue also 
points out how attacking these “multi-family dwellings” disproportionately targeted poor black 
people of the city, as they commonly combined households with extended family members to 
combat the public housing shortage.38 Over the course of nearly twenty years, the Golden 
Gateway project resulted in the widespread and systematic relocation of black downtown 
residents.   
 “Tyranny of the Courts”: Midcentury Anticommunist Resistance to Desegregation 
 Although the Mapp v. Board case provided the catalyst for integration in Chattanooga, it 
failed to produce the immediate results hoped for by many African American citizens, largely 
due to residential segregation, and ignited fierce resistance within the white community, further 
demonstrating the enduring dissatisfaction that pervaded Chattanooga’s method of 
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desegregation. White citizens of Chattanooga such as Dr. T.H. Patton and Kate Steele felt that 
the courts were overstepping their boundaries in any efforts to enforce desegregation. In letters to 
the Board of Education, Dr. Patton and Mrs. Steele relied extensively on mid-twentieth century 
anticommunist rhetoric to protest against mandatory integration. In order to understand the 
mentality which fueled letters such as those of Patton and Steele, one must first grasp the 
profound connection between the civil rights movement and the international struggle for 
democracy at the mid-twentieth century, as well as the ways in which southern white 
supremacists often appropriated anticommunist rhetoric for their own pro-segregationist agenda. 
In her book Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, historian Mary 
Dudziak contends that, during the Cold War era, the world perceived the institution of Jim Crow 
segregation in the army and public schools as antithetic to the democratic system America sought 
to spread. In order to rectify this damaging international image, the American government passed 
a number of civil rights reform legislature in the 1950s under President Truman, with the Brown 
vs. Board Supreme Court decision acting as one of the most crucial of these. As Dudziak states, 
“The Truman administration stressed to the Supreme Court the international implications of race 
discrimination and focused on the negative impact on U.S. foreign relations that a pro 
segregation decision [in Brown v. Board] might have.”39 In a time when newspapers nationwide 
were plastered with headlines about the activities of the “Reds” on a daily basis, the American 
public felt the pressure to adopt any measure that might combat the seemingly overwhelming 
force of Communism. 
 While the United States government and a good portion of its citizenry certainly 
understood the relationship between civil reform and international reputation, a small but 
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influential faction of white southerners distorted this correlation, ironically using anticommunist 
rhetoric to support the continuation of segregation in schools throughout the 1950s. Explaining 
this unique phenomenon in his work Black Struggle, Red Scare, Jeff Woods maintains, “During 
the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s…segregation and anti-Communism acted as the 
mutually reinforcing components of an extreme southern nationalism.”40 This “extreme southern 
nationalism” centered around a fervent desire to protect the conservative traditions of the 
antebellum South, imagined as a golden era that had been stripped away by the federal 
government. Components of this antebellum ideology included racially coded social 
stratification, fundamentalist religious beliefs, and the predominance of regional loyalty over 
federal allegiance. White Southerners’ desire to preserve a time in which slavery was a crucial 
component of the social structure, combined with a suspicion of the revolutionary potential of 
African Americans that was rooted in past slave rebellions, produced a fierce resistance to the 
end of Jim Crow laws. These southerners believed that, because former slaves had little 
experience with democracy or capitalism, the black population would be more prone to a 
communist worldview, automatically casting them as anti-American and anti-southern. However, 
as Woods emphasizes, they also took issue with the United States government itself, maintaining 
that the federal courts should not have jurisdiction over “southern ways”—a conflict dating back 
to the pre-Civil War state’s rights crisis.41 Thus, in the minds of these white supremacists, the 
power-greedy federal government and alleged anti-American, Communist black population 
conspired to disrupt the social, political, and economic patterns of the South with legislation such 
as Brown v. Board. Although this particular brand of anticommunism was never widely 
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accepted, it garnered a great deal of popularity in the South—enough to make the delicate 
process of desegregation even more difficult.  
 Close analysis of the letters from white citizens T.H. Patton and Kate Steele reveal the 
ways in which this southern anticommunist rhetoric pervaded the desegregation process in 
Chattanooga and hindered community leadership to implement a successful and accepted method 
of school integration. Although some regional and demographic differences distinguished Patton 
and Steele, with T.H. Patton being a male doctor from northern Tennessee and Kate Steele being 
a housewife from Chattanooga, the similarities in the tone and content of their letters is striking. 
Both, written to school board attorney Raymond B. Witt in the aftermath of the Mapp v. Board 
verdict, refer to the Supreme Court as a puppet of Communism, with Steele writing, “We are 
under the tyranny of courts the same as Russia is under the tyranny of the Communists.”42 
Similarly, Dr. Patton advised the school board to, “Protect your city from dangerous Communist 
Negro-mixing” and “the corrupt courts,” implying that African Americans were somehow 
inherently Communist and threatening to American values.43 The analogous language of these 
two letters ultimately upholds Woods’s premise that anticommunist rhetoric was a powerful if 
not definitive aspect of white supremacism throughout the south. If two individuals separated by 
region, gender, occupation, and social status used nearly identical terms to describe the 
phenomenon of desegregation, they were both clearly informed by the same influential ideology. 
While most Americans acknowledged the incompatibility of racial segregation and an 
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international struggle for democracy, citizens such as Patton and Steele turned this argument on 
its head—maintaining that integration would further the Communist cause.  
Turmoil Beneath Tranquility: School Board Proceedings Throughout the 1960s 
 Although the immediate aftermath of the Mapp v. Board legal case foreshadowed the 
problems that were to plague Chattanooga’s desegregation process throughout the next decade, 
quantitative evidence from 1967 and 1968 demonstrates just how ineffective the school board 
was in producing integrated schools. According to an official report issued by the board of 
education on the state of public schools as of the 1966-1967 school year, only twenty six of the 
forty four schools approved for desegregation actually had an integrated student population by 
this time.44 The report also indicated that only 57.2 percent of the 27,163 students in the 
Chattanooga public school system were enrolled in desegregated schools, and the majority of 
children granted transfers were white.45 In an effort to remedy this lack of progress towards full 
desegregation, the district court to which the Chattanooga school board was answerable ordered 
that the immediate desegregation of the eighth through twelfth grades occur during the 1967-
1968 school year, interrupting the grade-by-grade approach.46 This order marked a major turning 
point for both the Chattanooga school system and community members grappling with the 
integration process. As Raymond Witt observed in a letter to fellow attorney John Henniss, 
“When junior high schools and high schools are desegregated, for a number of children this will 
be their first desegregation experience…While there were a number of elementary schools that 
were not affected by desegregation because of the geographical housing pattern, this will not be 
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true in the junior high and high school groups.”47 Because elementary schools outnumbered 
junior high and high schools in Chattanooga, their attendance zones were more compact, 
meaning that many white and black children remained segregated in schools as a result of 
racially segregated neighborhoods. Secondary education facilities were fewer in number; 
therefore, the abolition of dual zones created zones with residential areas ranging from suburban 
enclaves to inner city public housing. Witt prophesied in his letter to Henniss the opposition that 
this would cultivate amongst white families who had previously avoided desegregation, using the 
predominantly white St. Elmo neighborhood as an example: “The people of St. Elmo have 
accepted the few negroes that have entered their elementary school with good graces…But St. 
Elmo is entirely surrounded by negro population…As a result, Lookout Jr. High would 
undoubtedly have a substantial negro population. The people in St. Elmo are extremely sensitive 
because they have seen this all coming.”48 Unlike the relatively uneventful experience with 
elementary school desegregation, the integration of middle and high schools would foster deep 
division within the Chattanooga community. 
 The inadequacies of Chattanooga’s method of desegregation can best be seen in the racial 
conflicts that plagued Brainerd High School throughout the 1969-1970 school year—conflicts 
that ultimately highlighted the unwillingness of both black and white Chattanooga citizens to 
accept desegregation as it stood fifteen years after Brown v. Board. In 1967, when immediate 
desegregation was ordered, Brainerd High still had an all-white student body, and its symbols of 
school pride—the Confederate flag, the “Rebel” mascot, and the “Dixie” anthem—highlighted a 
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history of antebellum white supremacy.49 This dynamic created a hostile environment when 
African American students enrolled for the first time in 1967, even though these tensions did not 
erupt until two years later. On the night of October 3, 1969, the students of Brainerd filled the 
campus stadium to watch their football team, the Rebels, square off against rivals in the hallmark 
southern tradition of the Friday night homecoming game. Of the hundreds of students in 
attendance, some thirty or forty African Americans represented the disproportionately small 
black population attending Brainerd, shortly after halftime, this small faction of students rose 
from their seats and moved down to the playing field, carrying with them a rolled Confederate 
flag—a symbol that would have sparked southern pride and a sense of patriotism within the vast 
majority of the game’s white attendees. Next, the African American students boldly stormed the 
playing area and, in full vision of spectators, set fire to the school’s beloved symbol—a move 
that incited angry white students, parents, and administrators to vacate their seats and flood the 
field.50 As violence broke out between black and white, police backup was called and ordered to 
remove all African Americans from the stadium. The headline of the Chattanooga Times the 
following morning read, “Disorderly Negroes Mar Brainerd Game,” and the cover story featured 
a photograph of an African American female student being pinned to the ground by the billy club 
of a police officer.51 
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 While this homecoming game incident proved to be the spark that ignited racial conflict 
at Brainerd, events over the next several weeks and months demonstrated that problems had 
existed long before this time. On October 7, 1969, several days after the burning of the 
Confederate flag, approximately one thousand of Brainerd’s twelve hundred white students 
exited the building in protest of administrators’ intention to abolish the flag symbol and the 
playing of the Dixie anthem.52 Over the next week, headlines spoke of rock-throwing and gunfire 
between black and white youths, which culminated in the institution of a city-wide curfew.53 
While the curfew succeeded in quelling outright confrontations, it did nothing to solve the deeper 
racial conflicts at work, as evidenced by the resurgence of strife the following spring. April of 
1970 was a particularly tumultuous time for Brainerd, as administrators were forced to close 
down the school for two days following a series of violent exchanges between black and white 
students.54 According to a report written and submitted by white Brainerd student David 
Thompson to a disciplinary committee commissioned to investigate events at Brainerd, the April 
controversy began when white and black students violently clashed in the hallways of the school: 
“[White student] Harold Simpson was walking down the hall…when the accused [black] student 
started chasing him. There were around 20 to 25 [black] students…These students then started to 
throw chairs at the windows as they were running. The evidence is the broken windows and the 
show case, the tables and chairs thrown through the halls.”55 The Chattanooga Times-Free Press 
similarly reported the incident, stating, “The trouble apparently began Wednesday during the 
                                                     
52 Collins, “1,000 Brainerd High Students…” 
53 “Curfew Called in City,” Newspaper article, Box 4, Folder 7, Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga 
Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Tennessee.  
54 Rex Sanders, “Ask Assistance in Restoring Order,” The Chattanooga News Free-Press, April 23, 1970, 
Newspaper clipping, Box 5, Folder 2, Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools 
Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Tennessee. 
55 “Letter from David Thompson to Disciplinary Committee,” May 5, 1970, Box 5, Folder 4, Special Collections, 
Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, 
Tennessee. 
 Reed 26 
noon recess with a fight in a restroom in which two white youths…were beaten by an 
undetermined number of Negro students.”56 On that day, all black students at Brainerd were 
dismissed from school at midday, loaded onto school buses, and removed from the parking lot as 
white students amassed in front of the campus and started chanting, “‘Blacks gotta go, hey! 
Blacks gotta go!’”57 
 Although the ubiquity of white-authored evidence, such as the disciplinary report issued 
by Thompson and the Chattanooga News-Free Press articles, make it difficult to piece together a 
nonpartisan account of what happened at Brainerd during these few months of conflict, a series 
of 1969 and 1970 newsletters entitled “The Black United Front” provides a starkly different 
narrative. Narrowly circulated, “The Black United Front” was issued weekly by Black Knights, 
Inc., a Chattanooga-based African American organization whose members aligned themselves 
with the growing black power movement. As their mission statement read, “The United Front is 
the official organ of Black Knights, Inc., with the purpose of bringing news pertinent to the black 
community of Chattanooga…and to be used by the people of the community as a means of 
bringing to the open the many problems plaguing them.”58 Throughout the fall of 1969 and 
spring of 1970, much of the newsletter’s content focused on the happenings at Brainerd, 
beginning with the protests against the Dixie anthem and Rebel flag. An anonymous “Black 
Brainerd Student” wrote in October 1969, “The honkies, from the hard-core racist to the 
perfume-sweet liberal, from Commissioner of Education….to the ‘Chattanooga Times,’ are 
trying to justify to the old south slavery symbols cherished by the white students at Brainerd 
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High School…So the black students at Brainerd are saying, ‘Take that Rebel flag…and flush it 
down the toilet where it belongs.’”59 The cover of another issue, this one published shortly after 
the April 1970 closing of the school, depicted a hand drawn cartoon of a fleet of white-hooded 
KKK members, labeled “The Brainerd Rebels.”60 The article underneath read, “There is an effort 
to cool the disturbances and to re-open Brainerd High School by the powers that be… Racism, 
nurtured from Mayor Drop-out Bender down to the redneck parents, is the real problem at 
Brainerd…The white people involved, including [principal] Von Schaaf, the faculty, the 
students, all must admit their racist tendencies before the Brainerd crisis can be smoothed out.”61 
 The openly oppositional tone of the Black United Front newsletters ultimately connected 
events in Chattanooga public schools to the black power movements growing in universities and 
other liberal spaces in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As black high school students at Brainerd 
found themselves increasingly embroiled in bitter racial turmoil, black university students across 
the nation were developing strategies to not only cope with, but also actively resist 
discrimination. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, or SNCC, formed in 1960 as 
one of the most crucial coalitions for young black activists. The SNCC promoted activism at a 
community level, encouraging students to participate in sit-ins and other forms of nonviolent 
protest. Their commitment to nonviolence began to waver in 1966, as the “black power” 
principles of racial pride, self-determination for black individuals, and the creation of a black 
identity took precedent over nonviolence.62 Another conduit for the spread of black power 
thought was the Black Panther Party, who espoused the idea that black communities were 
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“colonies within the mother country of Africa.”63 The Black Panther Party unapologetically 
called for the black race’s emancipation from white social, political, and economic institutions. 
Ralph Moore, the creator and editor of the United Front publication, associated himself with both 
of these groups and bolstered black power ideology in Chattanooga in the late 1960s with the 
formation of the Black Knights. Moore, a Chattanooga native and devout member of the Black 
Panther Party, returned to his hometown in 1966 with a radicalized notion of racial equality and 
black identity after attending the historically black Wilberforce College in Ohio and serving in 
the Vietnam War.64 The Black Knights were born out of Moore’s vision and the influence of 
other black activists in Chattanooga, many of whom associated themselves with SNCC.65 
Therefore, the Black United Front newsletter in many ways abridged the distance between the 
hallways of openly hostile schools such as Brainerd and the more liberalized spaces of college 
campuses and black power meetings. Because Ralph Moore and others like him brought to 
Chattanooga the ideology of SNCC and the Black Panthers, students such as the “Black Brainerd 
Student” were able to draw upon the rhetoric of black power movements in protesting the events 
happening at his or her own high school. In one image published in the Chattanooga News-Free 
Press during its coverage of the spring 1970 conflict, black Brainerd students are seen holding up 
one fist—an icon of the black power movement—as they awaited removal from the campus.66 
Black students at Brainerd clearly did not exist within a vacuum of naiveté to the injustices 
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served them; rather, they attempted to use the language and tactics of a much larger black 
activism to improve their personal circumstances.  
 Following the reopening of Brainerd High School in May of 1970, general coverage of 
the school faded from publication in the Chattanooga Times, indicating that administrators and 
students reached no true accordance or reform. However, the incidents were enough to spark 
renewed legal efforts from the James Mapp camp, who filed a motion for immediate relief in 
later 1969. According to a Chattanooga Times article entitled “Court Requested to Ask for Plan 
of Desegregation,” James Mapp and three additional plaintiffs “asked the U.S. District Court to 
request the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to draft a plan ‘to achieve 
immediately a unitary school system in the city of Chattanooga.’”67 The article also quotes Mapp 
who claimed, “The school board is building schools and addition to schools in such a manner as 
to conform to racial residential patterns…A freedom-of-choice desegregation plan employed by 
defendants in the high schools has not resulted in elimination of segregation therein.”68 In many 
ways, the complaints addressed by Mapp and his fellow plaintiffs—lack of school board action, 
continued segregation, and inferior conditions in predominantly African American schools—
sound identical to the ones initially issued ten years prior. However, Mapp also introduced a new 
type of language in this article, one whose key terms included “racial residential patterns” and 
focused on the way housing was related to school zoning. Thus, on the cusp of the 1970s, the 
Chattanooga community and school board faced an increasingly complex and difficult situation, 
one affected by community resistance, federal supervision, and grassroots activism within the 
schools themselves. Brainerd, and by extension the past ten years of desegregation, had proven 
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not to be a transformative or redemptive occurrence, but merely the first phase in a desegregation 
process that would only grow more complicated with time.  
Struggle in the Courtroom: 1971-1986 
 Throughout the early 1970s, as the Mapp v. Board of Education case faced a resurgence 
of litigation, the national climate surrounding desegregation and the civil rights movements 
evolved in ways that would come to directly affect educational policies and legal procedures in 
Chattanooga. Increasingly, school desegregation legal cases were ushered into higher courts, 
where federal courts handed down opinions and orders which set precedents for other 
communities throughout the nation. This decentralized approach to enforcement of the original 
Brown vs. Board mandate raised an entirely new set of questions during the 1970s, one of the 
most crucial of which was the extent of school boards’ responsibility in eliminating 
desegregation. In most major metropolises, the “freedom of choice” plans enacted during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, or during the initial phases of desegregation, resulted in schools that 
remained stubbornly segregated due to structural racism that contained black citizens within 
certain neighborhoods and school zones through housing discrimination, strategic construction of 
public housing, and urban revitalization efforts. Therefore, the question posed to school systems 
by federal courts evolved from, “What have you done to prevent segregation?” to “Have you 
done enough?” This inquiry resounded through cities across the nation and generated 
increasingly complex legal situations and community responses. Generally, federal judges 
sympathized with the NAACP and the liberal desegregationists during these late 1960s and early 
1970s trials, producing well-known verdicts such as those in Green v. County Board of New 
Kent, Alexander v. Holmes, and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg.69 Most of these verdicts 
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included provisions for busing, or the forced redistribution of students to achieve racial balance 
in all schools, which created strong backlash from white parents.  
 As a consequence of the turmoil created by many of the early 1970s busing plans, the 
latter half of the decade saw the reform or total removal of many previously instated 
desegregation policies. In cities such as Detroit and Boston, busing caused such an uproar 
amongst the white community that higher courts deemed it unworthy of the turmoil and frequent 
violence it fostered. Decisions such as the 1974 Supreme Court ruling in Bradley v. Milliken, 
wherein a busing plan that exchanged black kids from the urban center of Detroit with the white 
kids from the suburbs was overturned, contributed to the growing tide of wariness towards 
busing. Another frustration to the cause of desegregation was the massive “white flight” to 
suburbia that had begun. White families who felt uneasy about the integration of schools left 
urban centers in droves, settling amongst the growing suburbs with their private schools and 
majority-white public schools. The result of these obstructions was a gradual decline of interest 
in desegregation. The fervor with which federal courts had attacked the issue during the early 
1970s faded into lassitude and a pervasive sense of defeat. By the middle of the 1980s, most 
school systems were released from federal supervision and left to their own means, and as many 
historians have argued, resegregation of schools began.70  
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 In Chattanooga specifically, segregation in many public schools was sustained 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s through a successful combination of legal resistance to 
busing from white parents and claims on behalf of the school board that the massive white flight 
that occurred after 1972 could not be prevented. Essentially, the school board stalled concrete 
progress towards full desegregation in schools throughout the 1970s by claiming they needed an 
appeal ruling, funding for buses, or the return of white students before “real change” could take 
place. In the meantime, the lack of any visible, volatile protest from the community, black or 
white, enabled the school system to fly under the radar, while other regional centers, such as 
Nashville, attracted a great deal of attention due to the more violent nature of desegregation 
there.71 The stalling tactics employed by Chattanooga officials ultimately allowed the school 
board to keep many schools in a segregated state until the late 1970s and 1980s, when many 
courts dismissed desegregation cases out of exhaustion with the entire affair. Chattanooga was 
no exception. In 1986, the Mapp v. Board case was dismissed on the grounds that schools had 
stood in compliance with their federal court order since 1974. In reality, however, the Board of 
Education still operated a number of facilities, such as Howard High and Tyner High, that were 
either all-black or all-white. To the present day, Chattanooga public schools reflect the legacy of 
desegregation (and resegregation) in the city.  
“The Agony of May”: The 1971 Trial and Evolving Definitions of Responsibility 
 “I apologize for not getting back to you sooner,” wrote Raymond Witt in a letter to the 
city attorney Eugene Collins in July of 1971, “After the agony of May with the trial and 
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everything else going to hell, I decided to take some time off.”72 Witt’s “agony” refers to his 
experience at the 1971 courtroom hearing of Mapp v. Board of Education of Chattanooga, which 
came about as the eventual consummation of the motion for immediate relief filed by James 
Mapp and his NAACP attorney Avon Williams in the fall of 1969 after the Brainerd controversy. 
In this motion, Mapp and Williams had accused the Chattanooga school board of perpetuating 
segregation in schools through reliance on residential segregation. The May 1971 evidentiary 
hearing that resulted was arguably the most significant courtroom experience of the twenty-six-
year case, and it was certainly the most extensive and exhausting for the plaintiffs and defendants 
alike. For seven days between May 9th and 19th, Witt, Mapp, Williams, and their many respective 
witnesses rotated in and out of Judge Frank Wilson’s courtroom, producing hundreds of pages of 
transcribed briefs, questionings, and cross-examinations. This meticulous and laborious approach 
was largely due to the aforementioned national reframing of questions surrounding 
desegregation. Judge Wilson did not have to decide whether or not the Chattanooga school board 
had acted in regards to desegregation, for Wilson himself had originally approved their gradual, 
“freedom of choice” formula. Instead, he had to determine whether or not these actions had 
accomplished enough to eliminate desegregation “root and branch,” as the Supreme Court 
opinion in Green v. County Board of New Kent now required.73 Whereas previous hearings of the 
Mapp v. Board case focused on the school board taking action to open schools up to students of 
both races, this one questioned the structural racism and insidious sociopolitical forces that 
consistently rendered those actions ineffective, as well as what could be done to finally 
                                                     
72 “Raymond B. Witt Correspondence with Eugene Collins,” July 19, 1971, Box 9, Folder 4, Special Collections, 
Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, 
Tennessee.  
73 Avon Williams, “Motion for Further Relief in Civil Action No. 3564, December 30, 1968,” Box 7, Folder 4, 
Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee 
at Chattanooga, Tennessee.  
 Reed 34 
overcome them. Ultimately, the 1971 trial ushered in a new era of desegregation in Chattanooga, 
as Judge Wilson followed the precedent set by Judge McMillan in the Swann v. Charlotte case 
and found the school board responsible for lingering segregation in schools.  
 The transcriptions produced by this exhaustive, week-long evidentiary hearing reveal that 
the issue of residential segregation in Chattanooga was the crux of Wilson’s decision. Although 
discriminatory practices in housing and the ever-widening disparity between black and white 
neighborhood was nothing new for the city, this was the first time it could be used as legitimate 
evidence in court. NAACP attorney Avon Williams capitalized upon this day after day, offering 
concrete proof that school zones and housing sectors corresponded according to race in 
Chattanooga. Robert Taylor, a city planner brought in to witness that the school board had not 
acted with any intent of discrimination in establishing zones, repeatedly found himself on the 
receiving end of Williams’ dogged questioning. On the second day of trial, Williams 
demonstrated that, during the 1962-1963 school year, three hundred white children were bused 
out of Clara Carpenter, a neighborhood school whose closure was part of the original 
desegregation plan, and sent past two all-black schools to another all-white school, Glenwood 
Elementary. In no other situation did the school system use buses during those early years.74 
During the same day of cross-examining Robert Taylor, Williams used maps to show that, when 
housing projects were built during the urban redevelopment plans of the 1950s and 1960s, they 
were either constructed near and zoned for already black schools, or schools were built adjacent 
to them shortly afterwards. One example he emphasized involved Piney Woods elementary, 
which opened as an “integrated school” during the 1964-1965 school year. In what Taylor 
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labeled a “coincidence,” it lay across the street from the Emma Wheeler Housing Project in the 
southwestern quadrant of the city. Because the Emma Wheeler homes contained 338 black 
residents and only 2 white ones, Piney Woods’s student body was all-black from its opening.75 
The Riverside and City High exchange discussed previously revealed the opposite phenomenon, 
wherein new facilities were built in the northern suburbs to shelter its white, middle-class 
families from the effects of desegregation. In response to these inquiries, Robert Taylor typically 
answered with some variation of, “The primary criteria [of the school board] was for the 
convenience of the youngsters.”76 Responses such as this failed to dismantle even a brick of 
Williams’s wall of concrete evidence. In an editorial published in the Chattanooga Times-Free 
Press, courtroom onlooker Franklin McCallie observed, “[Williams] had them. They didn’t stand 
a chance.”77  
 Judge Wilson confirmed McCallie’s observation with his May 19, 1971 opinion, which 
supported Mapp’s motion for immediate relief by requiring the Chattanooga school board to 
submit an entirely new plan for desegregation—one which would acknowledge and remedy past 
discriminatory actions and abolish the ahistorical mindset behind “freedom of choice” plans. 
This opinion opened with the straightforward admission, “It appears, as admitted here in the 
record by every witness…save the attorney for the defense himself, that the Chattanooga School 
System is not in compliance with the law.”78 After reviewing the desegregation cases which had 
gained national attention over the previous years, Wilson went on to state, “Certainly there are 
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attractive features to the matter of freedom of choice in this area… Unfortunately, freedom of 
choice simply has not worked in the Chattanooga School System. You have to look no farther 
than the school administrations’ own statistics to demonstrate that fact.”79 Although Wilson’s 
opinion reads more like a placid acknowledgement of blatant inequality than an indignant 
condemnation of discriminatory practices, he nevertheless made good on his opinion one week 
later, when he ordered that a new desegregation plan be submitted by June 18, 1971 for approval 
and implementation by the start of the 1971-1972 school year.80 Almost immediately after the 
case was concluded, James Mapp and Avon Williams notified the school board of their intent to 
appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, Ohio. 
 The desegregation plan submitted by the Chattanooga school board, which underwent an 
amendment process before official approval by Judge Wilson on August 5, 1971, ultimately 
proved to be little more than another stalling tactic, as it used financial justification to avoid any 
extensive busing and included minimal changes in high school zoning. The opening page of the 
document reads, “In a confused and ambiguous area the Board has done the best it can under 
these circumstances, remembering that the maintenance of the educational opportunity for the 
25,000 children of Chattanooga is its paramount responsibility.”81 This statement was nothing 
new. In countless statements and proposals, the school board commonly used language that 
suggested desegregation would somehow compromise the holistic integrity of education, in 
defending its actions, or lack thereof. However, they were not wrong in accusing the courts of 
ambiguity. Although Judge Wilson had clearly found that the school board was responsible for 
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eliminating all vestiges of segregation, past and present, he never provided specificities on how 
this should be accomplished. Nowhere in his order did he explicitly mention busing. Therefore, 
the school board easily avoided the issue by claiming that buses were not a feasible part of the 
budget at that time: “Recognizing that transportation service could become an expensive item for 
the school system, an expenditure heretofore not projected as a part of the operate 
budget…Within the present school budget necessary financial support for transportation is not 
possible.”82 This proved an effective evasive maneuver, for even though the new desegregation 
plan was technically implemented in the fall of 1971, the lack of buses made any drastic zoning 
changes impossible. 
Chattanooga’s “Silent Majority”: Resistance to Busing in Regional and National Context 
Although the Chattanooga school board’s 1971 amended plan for desegregation appeared 
mild and provided few substantive changes compared to the drastic busing schemes that 
upheaved cities such as Charlotte, Detroit, and Boston throughout the 1970s, white citizens of 
Chattanooga still effectively resisted its implementation in several ways. First, they successfully 
obtained a lower court ruling that prohibited taxation to obtain funding for buses in January 
1972. Although this order was eventually reversed by Judge Wilson, it paralyzed any traction the 
amended desegregation plan might have gained in the crucial years after its supposed 
implementation. Next, white parents from the suburbs surrounding Chattanooga successfully 
exempted themselves from the city desegregation plan when their county schools were annexed 
into the Chattanooga Public School system in 1975. By annexing white-majority schools, the 
school board supplemented their rapidly declining enrollment figures; however, these schools 
were not officially included in the court-ordered plan and thus escaped any busing, zoning, or 
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pairing burdens. Finally, the most prevalent way white Chattanooga parents avoided grappling 
with the realities of desegregation was with massive white flight to private educational facilities. 
This tactic resulted in an abrupt, sharp decline in enrollment statistics for the school system as a 
whole and compromised public education in Chattanooga.83 In many ways, white citizens of 
Chattanooga modeled their resistance after the highly-publicized white backlash in communities 
such as Charlotte and Detroit. However, regional disparities also differentiated the story of 
Chattanooga’s desegregation and rendered the response of its white community unique. 
Comparison and contrast of white response in Chattanooga and these respective cities situates 
Chattanooga within the larger narrative of post-1970 desegregation in America.  
The events that took place in Charlotte, North Carolina throughout 1969 and 1971 
illustrate the efficacy of suburban mobilization in impeding a civil rights pursuit of 
comprehensive desegregation via busing and provide grounds for understanding methods of 
white resistance in Chattanooga. As one of the first regional centers to employ a two-way busing 
scheme, in which black children contained in low-income urban public housing were exchanged 
with the children of white suburbanites, Charlotte commanded the attention of the nation 
throughout the dramatic unfolding of its desegregation case. On April 23, 1969, two years prior 
to Chattanooga’s own busing order, Judge James McMillan issued an unprecedented ruling in the 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg case, arguing that “freedom of choice” plans, such as the one in 
effect in Chattanooga during this time, were inadequate at dismantling desegregation in a town 
where an entire faction of the population was concentrated in one residential area, as the black 
population was within the northwest quadrant of the inner city.84 Following his ruling, white, 
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middle-class parents across Charlotte began to mobilize in a movement that, as Matthew Lassiter 
argues, “charted a middle path between the caste framework of white supremacy and the 
egalitarian agenda of redistributive liberalism.”85 These men and women—stay-at-home 
mothers, low-level insurance executives, faithful church attendees—epitomized the qualities of 
suburban, middle-class respectability, and thus organized, not in the streets, but across picket 
fences, grocery aisles, and church pews. The Concerned Parents Association (CPA), a group of 
parents from the fringe suburban region of Mecklenberg County, was the product of this 
grassroots coalition and proved to be the driving force behind anti-busing resistance in Charlotte. 
The platform of the CPA boasted, “a color-blind defense of middle-class respectability” and 
“insisted that opposition to busing had nothing to do with racial prejudice.”86  
Although the antibusing campaign of the CPA successfully captured local and national 
attention throughout 1969 and 1970 and influenced legislators and public officials from the 
ground up, a deep commitment to public education and legality eventually triumphed in 
Charlotte, as the majority of white middle-class protestors laid their exactions aside when the day 
for busing implementation arrived. In September of 1970, after over a year of protest, volunteers 
from both the inner city and the suburbs united to oversee that the first few days of integration 
ran smoothly and peacefully.87 During the first year that schools operated under McMillan’s 
busing plan, “school attendance averaged more than 90 percent of projected enrollment, and 
white flight proved to be minimal in the suburban schools, now fully integrated along the 70-30 
districtwide ratio.”88 In the end, white Charlotte residents prided themselves on their “Charlotte 
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Way,” or their commitment to nonviolence and racial moderation. For the most part, the 
Charlotte busing crisis settled smoothly, even though suburban parents never recounted their 
stance on two-way busing. Rather than acknowledge the realities of structural racism and the 
necessity of deliberate policy designed to overcome housing segregation, white citizens of 
Charlotte credited peace in schools to their own willingness to concede rights for the sake of 
legal compliance.  
Because Chattanooga and Charlotte shared a number of demographic and economic 
similarities in the early 1970s, events in Charlotte had a direct bearing on the unfolding of 
desegregation in Chattanooga, and white resistance to busing in Chattanooga was in many ways 
modeled after the methods employed by the Concerned Parents Association. Similar to Charlotte, 
Chattanooga was a Sunbelt mid-sized metropolis composed of a densely populated, mostly black 
urban center and white suburban communities rippling outwards. Also like Charlotte, 
Chattanooga’s school system had operated under a “freedom of choice” plan throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, which, when combined with the pervasiveness of segregation in housing, 
produced minimally integrated schools. Lawyers representing the school board, particularly 
Raymond Witt, knew that the outcome of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg would have a strong 
bearing on Judge Wilson’s rulings. In a December 1970 memorandum to fellow lawyer John 
Hennis, Witt wrote, “Watch the Swann case. What happens over there will certainly swing the 
pendulum one way or the other for us.89 While Judge Wilson’s ruling certainly aligned with the 
basic premise of Judge McMillan’s, Chattanooga did not find itself bound to a specific busing 
plan as Charlotte did. Therefore, white resistance to busing in Chattanooga in many ways faced 
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fewer challenges than in Charlotte. White parents were not subject to the same level of intense 
federal supervision, and they were often able to work out their frustrations with desegregation at 
a local level, as can be seen in the lower-level court ruling that followed the 1971 Mapp v. Board 
of Education of Chattanooga trial.  
In the aftermath of Judge Wilson’s order, white parents of Chattanooga successfully 
blocked desegregation efforts by relocating their private interests to a local circuit court and 
obtaining a ruling that precluded the purchase of buses for the next two years. Two driving 
forces impelled this judgement. Amongst the suburbs surrounding the Chattanooga urban center, 
a coalition of white parents formed the Concerned Citizens of a Chattanooga—a name that 
suggested strong identification with the objectives and methods of the well-known Concerned 
Parents Association of Charlotte. Even more important was the East Lake-Boulevard Advisory 
Council. At the time, some of the wealthiest and most influential members of Chattanooga 
resided in East Lake, and it had long been known as an overwhelmingly white area of the city. In 
late 1971 and early 1972, as the school board sought to procure funds for buses from the city 
council, the East Lake-Boulevard Advisory Council fought equally hard to ensure this would not 
happen, attacking the stance of any city commissioner who voted in favor of funding the 
desegregation plan. As one member wrote, “We are, to say the least, shocked by the 
announcement of August 30, 1971 of the appropriation of our city tax monies…to implement the 
forced busing of our children out of their neighborhood schools.”90 The Concerned Citizens of 
Chattanooga took their contention one step further, suing the city commission in the circuit court 
of judge Joe Hunter, an avid advocate of the antibusing cause. In his January 1972 opinion, 
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which forbade the city commission of Chattanooga from levying taxes to pay for buses, he 
declared, “The busing concept violates the laws of reasoning and even sanity. It endangers and 
jeopardizes the health and lives of hundreds of small children….It disrupts the neighborhood’s 
whole concept of the American way of life and it depreciates quality education.”91 Like white 
Charlotte parents and President Nixon, Hunter evinced the idea that desegregation defied logic. 
Ultimately, Hunter’s ruling placed the city commission and the school board under two directly 
conflicting court orders, and any progress made towards providing funding for the purchase of 
school buses immediately halted. Although Judge Wilson overturned this lower order in August 
of the same year, the confusion created was enough to also propel him to postpone full 
implementation of the transportation plan until all appeals of the case had been exhausted or 
January 1, 1974, “whichever came first.”92 In a narrative that differed starkly from Charlotte’s, 
busing in Chattanooga was slowly being eliminated before it had even begun. 
Another influential busing narrative that captured national attention during the 1970s, this 
one outside of the “Sunbelt South,” occurred in the metropolitan area of Detroit and 
demonstrated the power of forceful, sometimes-violent resistance to forced integration—a form 
of activism that lay on the opposite end of the spectrum from that employed in Charlotte. In 
1971, as the outcry against cross-town busing slowly dwindled in Charlotte, an entirely new legal 
case opened in the northern metropolis of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs, particularly one 
named Warren. Known for the quality of its six school districts and safe neighborhoods, Warren 
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became a haven for white families who could afford to flee Detroit’s inner city as revitalization 
efforts concentrated public housing units there.93 Prior to the desegregation of public schools 
there, Warren had already achieved a negative reputation with the federal government due to a 
1970 investigation of discriminatory housing practice. As can be imagined, a community of this 
nature took great issue with the liberalization of Detroit’s school board administration that began 
in the late 1950s, as the NAACP coalesced with white activists to reform the horrific conditions 
of black schools in preparation for desegregation. However, their protests could not halt the tide 
of integration, and in April of 1971, the lawsuit that would come to be known as Bradley v. 
Milliken reached the courtroom of federal district judge Stephen Roth. In June 1972, after finding 
the Detroit school system guilty of de jure segregation, Judge Roth approved a two-way busing 
plan that would cover fifty-three school districts in southeastern Michigan and affect 780,000 
students—the most comprehensive busing order ever handed down by a federal court.94 
By summer of 1974, Detroit’s school desegregation case finally reached the Supreme 
Court, where a 5 to 4 overturn of Roth’s two-way busing order set a new national precedent for 
the elimination of massive two-way busing plans. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger wrote that because it could not be shown that Warren and other suburban towns were 
guilty of de jure segregation, busing plans could not punish them through subjection to cross-
town busing.95 With this rejection of Judge Roth’s metropolitan plan, they sent the responsibility 
for finding a solution back to Detroit, where it fell into the hands of Judge Robert DeMascio. 
DeMascio hurriedly put together a quick-fix package that would bus students within the city, 
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rework the school system’s disciplinary policies, and institute a reading program to “make up for 
the second-class educational experience that the school board had provided generations of black 
students.96 The Supreme Court’s overhaul and DeMascio’s mild remedy to the serious problem 
of segregation in Detroit reflected a changing of the judicial tide towards forced integration 
through busing throughout the nation. Whereas the rule of law had upheld affirmative 
responsibility on behalf of the school board to eliminate segregation in 1971 in Charlotte, by 
1974, it took the opposite position. Residents of Warren and other southeastern Michigan 
suburbs, despite the volatility and occasional violence of their protest movements, successfully 
secured their safe suburban harbor, with its white-majority neighborhood schools. Because of 
this, historian David Riddle argues, “any liberal consensus that might once have shaped public 
opinion [crumbled]…Thus, Detroit became the most segregated metropolitan area in the 
nation.”97 
Although Chattanooga’s white resistance to busing was less publicized than that of 
Detroit’s, the two industrial centers actually adopted similar desegregation and busing policies 
by the mid-1970s, largely through the efforts of their white citizens. Whereas the white 
community of Warren relied on openly hostile tactics, such as the burning of Roth in effigy, to 
indicate their unwillingness to cope with busing, the white citizens of suburban Chattanooga 
relied on a campaign to exempt certain majority-white suburban schools from any desegregation 
plans imposed by federal court. These disparate methods produced the same outcome. Numerous 
white children of Chattanooga and Detroit’s middle-class families were spared the burden of 
busing, zoning, or pairing plans. While pro-segregationists accomplished this in Detroit through 
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an official repeal of Judge Roth’s order in 1974, the fight of white Chattanooga parents did not 
begin until a year afterwards. During the summer of 1975, seven schools previously operated by 
the Hamilton County school system switched administrations and officially became part of the 
Chattanooga Public School system, giving the school system an additional 5,085 students that it 
desperately needed due to extensive white flight.98 In the previous school year, the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) launched an investigation into the Hamilton County 
school system and found that over 2,000 white, or “non-minority” pupils residing within the city 
of Chattanooga were attending county schools as a means of escape from desegregated city 
schools.99 Although HEW condemned this as a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the annexation that took place the following year served only to solidify the opportunity 
for white residents of Chattanooga to flee to the suburban school of their choice. According to 
the zoning plans designed by the Chattanooga school board, the newly annexed schools would 
serve the same populations they had served as county schools, creating a blatantly segregated 
total of 5,648 white students and 23 black students.100 Unsurprisingly, James Mapp and Avon 
Williams filed a motion in court requesting that they be subject to the more comprehensive city 
desegregation plan, due to their overwhelmingly white student bodies.101 With a waning 
commitment to desegregation similar to that of Justice Warren Burger in the Bradley v. Milliken 
case, Judge Wilson denied Mapp’s request for further relief and approving the zones submitted 
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by the school board, a decision that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld. Ultimately, these 
annexations reaffirmed that many Chattanooga schools still relied on flagrant segregation to 
retain their student population and demonstrated that the white community of Chattanooga could 
effectively resist busing without highly visible or publicized defiance to the rule of law.  
“End It All”: The Denouement of Desegregation in Chattanooga 
 In December 1986, District Judge Allan Edgar ruled that the court-approved 
desegregation plan from 1971 had been fully implemented in Chattanooga’s public schools, 
ending the longest running case in Chattanooga’s court history and releasing the school system 
from federal supervision.102 In his opinion, Edgar wrote, “A school desegregation case need not 
last forever. The role of this court has not come to an end. It is no longer appropriate for this 
court to be involved in the operation of the Chattanooga city schools, a task now best left entirely 
to publicly elected officials.”103 In the years following the dismissal of the twenty-six-year suit, 
these “publicly elected officials” set about dismantling the few provisions of the desegregation 
plan that remained in effect. In 1989, school board attorney Raymond Witt advised that the 
Chattanooga school system “eliminate virtually all bus service,” stating any action would be 
constitutionally permissible as long as it was “not adopted to produce a racially segregated 
school system.”104 Chattanooga citizens celebrated the end of the case as well, publishing 
editorials under titles such as “Edgar Shows Good Sense” and “Time to Call It Quits.”105 In 
                                                     
102 Judge Allan Edgar assumed the agenda of Judge Frank Wilson upon Wilson’s death in 1982. “School Integration 
Case Ends: Judge Edgar Believes Plan ‘Fully Implemented,’” The Chattanooga News-Free Press, December 10, 
1986, Newspaper clipping, Box 18, Folder 2, Special Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools 
Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Tennessee.  
103 “School Integration Case…” 
104 “Raymond B. Witt correspondence with Harry Reynolds, July 20, 1989,” Page 3, Box 19, Folder 4, Special 
Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga, Tennessee. 
105 “Edgar Shows Good Sense, The Chattanooga News-Free Press, December 12, 1986, Box 18, Folder 2, Special 
Collections, Raymond B. Witt Chattanooga Public Schools Desegregation Records, University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga, Tennessee. “Time to Call it Quits,” The Chattanooga News-Free Press, December 12, 1986, Box 18, 
 Reed 47 
“Time to Call It Quits,” an anonymous citizen wrote, “It’s high time the plaintiffs in this case 
admit that it’s gone as far as it can go and abandon efforts to use the schools as battleground for 
social change.”106 Newspaper articles such as these and the school board’s immediate efforts to 
descale busing and transportation provisions ultimately contributed to the prevailing sentiment 
that the end of desegregation constituted a positive change for the community.  
 Despite the celebratory atmosphere brought about by the conclusion of the Mapp v. 
Board case, troubling statistics defined the Chattanooga school system throughout the final 
quarter of the twentieth century. In 1986, when the federal court deemed schools compliant with 
the desegregation plan, twenty-five out of the thirty-six elementary schools in the system were 
“racially identifiable,” meaning that seventy percent or more of the student population was either 
black or white. Of these schools, five still contained an all-black or all-white student body. This 
trend held true for middle and high schools as well, with schools such as Howard High 
maintaining an all-black student population.107 While enrollment statistics for the system as a 
whole remained low, seventeen percent of children in Chattanooga and Hamilton County 
attended one of the ten private school institutions in the city. This percentage stood well above 
both the state average of seven percent and the national average of eleven percent—a testament 
to the white exodus to private schools that occurred during the process of desegregation.108 These 
issues continue to linger within the Chattanooga public school system today. According to 
information compiled by UnifiEd, a nonprofit organization formed to supplement public 
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education in Chattanooga, a number of “racially identifiable” schools still exist within the 
system.109 
 The present conditions of Chattanooga’s public schools ultimately reflect the legacy of 
the twenty-six-year battle for desegregation fought in both hallways and courtrooms. From 1954, 
when the Supreme Court issued the Brown v. Board mandate, until 1986, citizens and public 
officials of Chattanooga struggled to define and implement desegregation within schools. During 
the first phase of this process, roughly 1955 until 1970, the Chattanooga school board attempted 
to appease both federal courts and the community with a “freedom of choice” plan that failed due 
to residential segregation, protests within schools, and an evolving understanding of the deeper 
issues which kept white and black children from attending the same schools. In 1971, these 
factors resulted in a more comprehensive desegregation plan which included busing provisions 
and required that the school board take affirmative action to dismantle lingering segregation in 
schools. However, as in other communities such as Charlotte and Detroit, white resistance 
effectively precluded this plan from producing integrated schools. By securing a lower court 
order prohibiting funding for busing and exempting a number of annexed schools from 
desegregation measures, the white community of Chattanooga, aided by the compliance of the 
school board, ensured that many schools would remain segregated until the dismissal of the 
Mapp v. Board case in 1986.  
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Appendix of Images 
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“Brainerd High School Closed Today; Officials Confer on Opening, Trouble,” The Chattanooga News-Free Press, 
April 16, 1970.  
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